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and the Maputo Declaration 13Given the number of undernourished people in the developing world and the increasingly
complex risks to food security, policymakers are faced with an enormous agenda. Freeing
people from hunger will require more and better-targeted investments, innovations, and poli-
cy actions, driven by a keen understanding of the dynamic risks and forces that shape the
factors affecting people’s access to food and the links with nutrition. 
The International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI’s) International Model for Policy
Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) provides insight into the manage-
ment of these risks through appropriate policy actions. By projecting future global food sce-
narios to 2050, IMPACT explores the potential implications of policy action and inaction in
several main risk areas as well as the effects on child malnutrition in the developing world,
commodity prices, demand, cereal yields, production, and net trade. 
In the progressive policy actions scenario, which assumes increased investment in rural
development, health, education, and agricultural research and development, developing-
country governments and the international community are able to dramatically reduce the
number of food-insecure people, leading to a worldwide decline in hunger. Under these con-
ditions, Latin America and China are able to virtually eliminate child malnutrition by 2050.
Bolstered by the development and dissemination of improved technologies and better infra-
structure, crop production and yields increase in developing countries. Notably, the bulk of
the growth in production is driven by yield increases rather than by expanding land area.
Spurred by growth in the agricultural sector, average incomes in developing countries
increase. Rising incomes bolster demand for high-value agricultural products, such as meat,
dairy, and fruits and vegetables; global livestock production more than doubles, for example.
Average per capita calorie supplies for developing countries exceed 3,400 per day, well in
excess of minimum requirements.
The policy failure scenario assumes greater political discord and more extensive agricul-
tural protectionism, together with the failure of policies to deal with food emergencies related
to conflict. Slow growth and trade restrictions lead to stagnation in average per capita calo-
rie availability, which remains only slightly above minimum requirements until after 2030,
when availability increases. In addition, crucial investments in agriculture, rural development,
and poverty reduction are forgone or displaced. Because of limited investment in agricultural
research and technology, this scenario has a high level of crop area expansion as a result of
relatively rapid population growth and slim yield improvements in developing countries. This
scenario also results in flat maize prices, declining per capita cereal demand, falling beef
prices, and relatively flat meat demand. As a result of the policies in this scenario, the num-
ber of malnourished children in developing countries rises between 1997 and 2015, after
which there are only modest declines. 
Executive Summary
viiIn the technology and natural resource management failure scenario, yield growth falls
even more than under the preceding scenario, forcing farmers to move into marginal pro-
ducing areas, which causes a more rapid expansion of cereal area into less productive land
that does not compensate for the yield shortfalls (and causes environmental degradation). As
a result, cereal prices rise substantially through 2030 and then fall off only gradually. Beef
and other meat prices, which are affected by the price of feed, follow a similar pattern.
Developing-country per capita calorie availability is essentially unchanged over 1997–2050
and remains at a barely adequate average level. Given unequal access to the food that is
available, millions of people actually consume less than the minimum. The occurrence of child
undernourishment is even higher than under the policy failure scenario in all developing-coun-
try regions. Overall, the technology and natural resource management failure scenario results
in the worst impact on food security and child malnourishment in the developing world. 
The progressive policy scenario outlines several of the most crucial positive steps.
National governments and the international community must assume a new focus on agricul-
tural growth and rural development, along with increasing their investments in education,
social services, and health. Policies to encourage synergistic growth in the nonfarm sectors
are also needed to spur broad-based economic growth. Underpinning these strategies and
research agendas must be a firm commitment to reducing hunger and improving the welfare
of the world’s undernourished people. Over the past several decades, the world has made
remarkable progress in reducing undernourishment
as expressed by food energy deficiency, also
referred to as hunger.
1 According to the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), the number of undernourished people in
developing countries fell from 920 million in 1980
to 798 million in 2001, while the proportion of peo-
ple living under such conditions dropped substan-
tially, from 28 to 17 percent. Economic growth,
along with programs targeted to the poor in some
countries, contributed significantly to the progress.
Increased investment in agricultural research and
technological improvements has heavily supported
this decline by catalyzing growth in per capita pro-
duction of cereals—the most important source of
calories—and lowering real cereal prices to the
benefit of poor consumers. Between 1967 and
1997, global cereal production increased 84 per-
cent, as per capita cereal production rose from 295
kilograms to 325 kilograms (Rosegrant, Paisner,
and Meijer 2003). Food availability has increased
by 26 percent over the past three decades to reach
2,667 calories per person per day (Rosegrant et al.
2001). Furthermore, real world prices of major
cereals, such as rice and maize, declined by 29
percent and 30 percent, respectively, between
1982 and 1997. 
However, there are concerns that water scarci-
ty, soil depletion, the lack of technology adoption
and dissemination, political and civil conflict, and
the continued threat of disease epidemics such as
HIV/AIDS pose a grave threat to the food security
of growing populations in the developing world.
There are ominous signs. Progress in hunger reduc-
tion slowed considerably during the late 1990s:
between 1995 and 2001, the number of under-
nourished people in the developing world
increased by more than 18 million. If China is
excluded from consideration, the number of under-
nourished people in the developing world
increased by nearly 28 million during this period
(Figure 1). In addition, there are indications that
price fluctuations are rising as world cereal stocks
are reduced (see Box 1). Moreover, micronutrient
malnutrition is widespread, and its consequences
are significant (Table 1). 
The majority of the world’s hungry people
depend heavily, both directly and indirectly, on
growth in the agricultural sector for both food and
their livelihoods—either as farmers or as net pur-
chasers of food. Most of the world’s hungry,
approximately 80 percent, live in rural areas,
where access to markets, health care, education,
and infrastructure such as telecommunications and
roadways is scarce (Hunger Task Force 2003).
These areas are often characterized by poor quali-
ty of natural assets, a fragile natural resource base,
1.  Introduction
1 Undernourishment, or hunger, is defined as food intake that is continuously inadequate to meet dietary energy requirements.
Food insecurity is defined as a situation that exists when people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious























Figure 1—Hunger in the developing         
world, 1980–2001
Source: FAO 2003.2
Box 1—Worrisome trends in global commodity prices
Recent trends in world food prices and stocks may warrant increased monitoring and attention. Over
the past five years, global cereal production has remained flat at under 1.9 billion tons, which means
that on a per capita basis, production has shrunk, according to data from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. In addition, current global grain stockpiles are falling fast, from approximately 580 million
tons in 1997 to 300 million tons in 2003. In China, the situation has been changing particularly rap-
idly, with stocks falling by half during the past three years. Not surprisingly, this stagnation in produc-
tion, coupled with the decrease in stocks, has driven prices for rice, wheat, and maize higher. In the
case of wheat, the price has increased by more than 50 percent in four years. 
Flat production is partly a result of low prices and low levels of investment in research and tech-
nology in recent years. The price increases expressed in U.S. dollars partly reflect the declining value
of U.S. currency. But explicit trade policy changes as well as production constraints are affecting prices
too. In this situation, industrialized countries could help with more open food-trade policies to facilitate
global price stabilization. 
Of particular concern are the potential effects of these price shifts on the poor: compared to 30
years ago—the time of the last world food crisis caused by high prices—many of the poorest of the
poor are now more vulnerable to price increases because they no longer produce as much in the way
of subsistence crops for home consumption as they used to. Many are now landless farmers, and many
are urban poor. The world today also has a substantially larger middle class that will not adjust its eat-
ing habits because of higher food prices. Thus, at a global level there will be less collective “belt-tight-
ening” as prices increase. This situation is compounded by the dismantling of public price-stabilization
schemes in many developing countries. 
These trends warrant increased monitoring and attention to the impact of short-term changes in
cereal production and price on the poor. Moreover, the welfare and poverty effects of price changes
brought on by both trade protection and liberalization are both highly relevant and need to be







Iron 4 to 5 billion people All, especially 
women and children
 Reduced cognitive ability,
 childbirth complications, and
 reduced physical capacity and productivity
Vitamin A 140 million preschoolers 




 Increased child and maternal mortality, 
 blindness
Zinc May be as widespread 
as iron deficiency
Women and children  Illness from infectious diseases,
 pregnancy and childbirth complications, and 
 reduced birth weight
Iodine  2 billion people, of which 
285 million are children
All, especially children  Slower fetal brain growth,
 Slower mental development of children, and 
 reduced cognitive ability in schoolchildren
 poor child growth,
Table 1—Extent and consequences of micronutrient malnutrition 
Source: ACC/SCN 2004.  and scarce soil, land, and water resources. Yet
these populations lack access to information and
technologies to provide greater returns in the pres-
ence of these resource constraints. Because of slow
income growth and risky environments, farmers
have little savings to invest in land and livestock
improvements. Crop area expansion without tech-
nological improvements results in low crop yields
and, combined with rising population, worsening
food insecurity and hunger. In addition, population
growth and degraded land resources have led to
farm size reductions, to the point that some farms
are barely productive, as in many parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa (Table 2). These already vulnerable
populations are severely affected by variable
weather patterns, such as floods and droughts, and
disease epidemics, especially HIV/AIDS, which
erode physical and human assets and drive house-
holds deeper into poverty and hunger. Trade pro-
tection in wealthy countries and trade restrictions
between developing countries further limit the abili-
ty of developing-country farmers to generate growth
in their agricultural sectors, therefore reinforcing the
negative synergies between low agricultural growth
and food insecurity. 
Approximately 17 percent of the world’s hun-
gry people are very young children, less than six
years of age. The incidence of child hunger and
malnutrition is a powerful indicator of the limited
progress being made in the fight against hunger
and serves as a benchmark for tracking the achieve-
ment of the Millennium Development Goal of halv-
ing the proportion of hungry people by 2015.
2
Although the absolute numbers of undernourished
children in the developing world have declined
from 172.1 million in 1980 to 135.5 million in
2000, progress has been slow and uneven (Figure
2). Although Latin America and South Asia have
made major improvements in reducing child malnu-
trition, the number of hungry children is increasing
rapidly in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa
(ACC/SCN 2004) (Figures 2 and 3). Clearly, these
figures indicate that the Millennium Development
Hunger Goal will not be realized without dramati-
cally increased financial and political commitment.
The rights-based approach to development and
food security can help to generate political commit-
ment (see Box 2).





Kenya 0.08 0.17 0.31 1.10 0.56
Ethiopia 0.03 0.12 0.22 0.58 0.55
Rwanda 1984 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.62
Rwanda 1990 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.39 0.43
Rwanda 2000 0.06 0.02
Malawi
0.13 0.43 0.54
0.08 0.15 0.25 0.60
Zambia 0.12 0.26 0.48 1.36 0.50
Mozambique 0.10 0.23 0.40 1.16 0.51
(hectare)
Table 2—Smallholder land distribution in selected African countries
Source: Jayne et al. 2003.
2 The Millennium Development Goals call for halving the proportion of the world’s hungry people. The World Food Summit


















































































Figure 2—Child undernourishment in the developing world, 
1980–2000
Source: ACC/SCN 2004.
Figure 3—Child undernourishment in Africa by region, 
1980–2000
Source: ACC/SCN 2004.5
Box 2—Overview of the human right to food
In the aftermath of World War II, the international community codified a set of human rights principles—
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—for the purpose of promoting a more just and peaceful
world order. Prominent in the code was the right to food and other basic necessities. Five decades later,
the World Food Summit Plan of Action called upon the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
. . . To better define the rights related to food . . . and to propose ways to implement and
realize these rights as a means of achieving the commitments and objectives of the World
Food Summit, taking into account the possibility of formulating voluntary guidelines for food 
security for all. (FAO 1996, Plan of Action paragraph 61)
Since then, the UN High Commissioner and the FAO, along with nongovernmental organizations
and some national governments, have collaborated in a series of expert consultations and conferences
focusing on the right to food. In 1999, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
adopted General Comment 12, defining the right to food. It acknowledges that the right to adequate
food will have to be realized progressively, and within the limits of available resources, but it empha-
sizes that states have an obligation to take the necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger.
(United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1999).
In 2003 and 2004, the FAO convened four sessions of an Intergovernmental Working Group for
the Elaboration of a Set of Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to
Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security. In September 2004, the FAO Committee on
World Food Security approved the guidelines, which are the first such set of voluntary operating prin-
ciples created to help states implement a particular human right—and on November 22, 2004, they
were approved by the FAO Council, which is composed of Ministerial representatives of FAO member
states. Although these guidelines do not create any binding obligations, they offer broad and practical
suggestions, and encourage international cooperation in support of national government efforts. The
guidelines are available at: <http://www.fao.org/righttofood/common/ecg/51596_en_VGS_eng_
web.pdf>.
Recognition of state obligations with respect to the right to food empowers civil society to demand
that these rights be fulfilled by their governments. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, states that take
on these obligations are not required to supply three meals daily to all citizens. Rather, the state must
respect (that is, not interfere with) the right of everyone within its borders to have access to adequate
food, protect that right from encroachment by others, facilitate opportunities by which that right can be
enjoyed (for example, through employment or access to land), and only in the last instance fulfill the
right to food for those unable to do so themselves. Perhaps most importantly, as South African Human
Rights Commissioner Charlotte McClain-Nhlapo has pointed out, the rights-based approach to food
security makes “the critical shift from treating hunger and food insecurity as a charitable endeavor to
recognizing adequate food as a right that must be protected by law” (McClain-Nhlapo 2004, 4).Given the number of undernourished people in the
developing world and the increasingly complex
risks to food security, policymakers are faced with
an enormous agenda. Freeing people from hunger
will require more and better-targeted investments,
innovations, and policy actions, driven by a keen
understanding of the dynamic risks and forces that
shape the factors affecting people’s access to food
and the links with nutrition. 
The International Food Policy Research
Institute’s (IFPRI’s) International Model for Policy
Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT) provides insight into the management of
these risks through appropriate policy actions. By
projecting future global food scenarios to 2050, the
IMPACT model explores the potential implications
of policy inaction and action in several main risk
areas and the effects on child malnutrition in the
developing world, commodity prices, demand,
cereal yields, production, and net trade. 
In this paper we present three scenarios of dif-
ferent policy alternatives, involving varying risks
and opportunities: a progressive policy actions sce-
nario, a policy failure scenario, and a technology
and natural resource management failure scenario.
We further explore new and salient food and nutri-
tion security dimensions related to each of the sce-
narios.
Progressive policy actions scenario
In a progressive policy actions scenario, we assume
a new focus on agricultural growth and rural devel-
opment. Developing countries’ public investments
and government expenditures on agriculture and
rural development, appropriately supported by offi-
cial development assistance, increase between
2005 and 2015 and stabilize thereafter.
Investments in education, social services, and health
increase. The rate of agricultural technology
improvement is high owing to increased investment
in agricultural research and development. Irrigation
efficiency and water use efficiency improve in this
scenario, and the rate of irrigation expansion is
moderate to high. Furthermore, producer support to
farmers in wealthy countries declines substantially,
dropping to half of current levels in 2010, and half
of this level in 2020. 
Policy failure scenario
In the policy failure scenario, we assume trade and
political conflicts, with no progress on global agri-
cultural trade negotiations and increased levels of
trade restrictions worldwide. Today, we cannot
exclude political-economic forces from producing
such outcomes. The policy failure scenario assumes
decreases in yield growth for all crops and fish, and
decreases in numbers growth for all livestock. It also
shows policies that lead to stagnant world trade
and slow growth in developing countries’ net
imports. This impasse in agricultural trade liberal-
ization further contributes to the growing food
deficit in developing countries. Compatible with
these scenario elements are political conflicts and
low investments in social services and agricultural
research and development. Producer support to
farmers in wealthy countries triples from current lev-
els by 2020 and remains steady through 2050,
and the population transition to lower birth rates is
delayed, resulting in higher population growth than
in the progressive policy actions scenario.
6
2. Exploring Risks to and Opportunities for 
Food Security in the 21st Century7
Technology and natural resource 
management failure scenario
Water mismanagement, declining irrigation effi-
ciency, lack of adaptation to climate change, and
pest problems in agriculture characterize this sce-
nario. Low agricultural investments undermine the
development of new agricultural technology and
contribute to marginal levels of irrigation efficiency
and lack of improvement in water use efficiency. In
addition, investments in many sectors, including
education, social services, and health, are low in
developing countries. The lack of growth in agricul-
tural yields is the outcome of all of the above and
also partly a result of weak income growth in devel-
oping countries and only moderate income growth
in industrialized countries. Again, the demographic
transition is assumed delayed in this scenario. 
For a more complete description of the IMPACT
model and of each of the three scenarios, see the
Appendix.8
Through increasing investment in rural develop-
ment, health, education, and agricultural research
and development, developing country governments
and the international community are able to dra-
matically reduce the number of food-insecure peo-
ple, leading to a worldwide decline in hunger.
Increased investments in crop research, technologi-
cal change and dissemination, and reform of water
management systems serve to boost water produc-
tivity and the growth of rainfed crop yields.
Improved policies and increased investment in rural
infrastructure help link remote farmers to markets
and reduce the high risks associated with rainfed
farming. Bolstered by the development and dissem-
ination of improved technologies and better infra-
structure, crop production and yields increase in
developing countries (Figure 4). Notably, the bulk
of the growth in production is driven by yield
increases, rather than by expanding land area
(Figure 5). Furthermore, in this scenario, producer
subsidies in wealthy countries decline in half by
2010, and then are halved again in 2020.
Because of the removal of producer support, which
drives world prices artificially low, beef prices rise
slightly after 2010 (Figure 6). Spurred by growth in
the agricultural sector, average incomes in devel-
oping countries increase. Rising incomes bolster
demand for high-value agricultural products, such
as meat, dairy, and fruits and vegetables; for
instance, global livestock production more than
doubles (Figure 7).
As a result of these impacts, average per capi-
ta calorie supplies for developing countries exceed
3,400 per day, well in excess of minimum require-
ments (Figure 8). Gains in child nutrition in devel-
oping countries are steady and occur in all regions,
including Sub-Saharan Africa, after 2015 (Figures
9 to 13). As represented below, the progress in
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Figure 4—Projected cereal yields in 
developing countries, 
all scenarios



















Figure 5—Projected sources of growth 
in world cereal production,      
progressive policy actions 
scenario 
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.9
reducing child malnourishment dramatically
diverges from the results of the policy failure and
technology and natural resource management fail-
ure scenarios. Latin America and China virtually
eliminate child malnutrition by 2050 (Figures 12
and 13). See the appendix for more details on the
assumptions and projections made under this sce-
nario, such as those concerning the fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration of populations, and the nonfood
determinants of childhood malnutrition. 
Promising Policy Initiatives
Do we have reason to hope that the international
community and governments are moving toward
progressive policy action to combat hunger and
malnutrition in the developing world? 
There are positive signs. Developing countries
and the broader international community have col-
lectively embraced the goals of the World Food
Summit, sponsored by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, and the United
Nations Millennium Development Goals, both of
which call for dramatic reductions in hunger and
increased political will and monetary support. In
addition, bilateral and multilateral donors are plac-
ing renewed emphasis on agriculture and rural
development. The World Bank’s new rural strategy,
released in 2002, is a crucial example. Whether
donors will provide additional resources to support
agriculture and rural development is a key issue.
Donor assistance to agriculture and rural develop-
ment has notably declined in recent years: at the
end of the 1990s, the level of official development
assistance provided to agriculture was lower than
at the beginning of the decade in real terms. 
In 2003, the Heads of State Summit of the
African Union agreed in its Maputo Declaration in
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) framework to move toward directing 10
percent of public expenditures to agriculture, in
order to bolster food security on the continent (see
Box 3, page 13). By contrast, in the 1990s, African
governments devoted on average just 5 percent of
public expenditures to agriculture. It is encouraging
that African policymakers at the highest level are
expressing a commitment to reverse the downward
spiral in food and agriculture in Sub-Saharan
Africa, where per capita food production has
declined over the past 30 years and child malnutri-
tion is severe and growing. Two African Summits in
2004 had agriculture and food security high on the
agenda, and the IFPRI 2020 Conference on Food
and Nutrition Security in Africa attracted African
leaders to a focus on action (2020 Africa
Conference Advisory Committee 2004).
Latin American ministers of agriculture met in
early November 2003 for a major initiative to map
out opportunities to improve food security. They
adopted an ambitious agricultural initiative, AGRO
2003–2015 Plan of Action for Agriculture, where-
in they recognized agriculture as a key component
for the development of their countries. The plan con-
tains a broad agenda to promote prosperity in rural
communities, create food security, alleviate poverty,
and foster the sustainable development of agricul-
ture and the rural environment. 
Individually, developing-country governments
around the world are showing a new spirit of action
to address food insecurity and undernutrition.
Preliminary results of an ongoing review by IFPRI
suggest that most of the governments of the 34 coun-
tries in which the highest number and percentage
3-
of the world’s food-insecure people live have
recently declared policy goals regarding food secu-
rity. Most of these countries have already taken steps
to translate declarations into redesigned policy
actions. At least 22 countries have redesigned exist-
ing policies or adopted new agriculture and nutrition
policies to enhance food security in the last five
years. 
A major element of the success of these strate-
gies and declarations will be the concomitant
increase in domestic budgetary allocation to agri-
3 These include the 20 countries with the highest number of malnourished people and the 20 countries with the highest per-
centage of malnourished population in 2002 (Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burundi, Central African
Republic, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Korea,
Liberia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
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Figure 6—Projected world beef price, 
all scenarios




























Progressive policy actions scenario  
Policy failure scenario
Technology and natural resource
management failure scenario
Figure 7—Projected world livestock 
production, all scenarios





















Progressive policy actions scenario
Policy failure scenario
Technology and natural resource 
management failure scenario
Figure 8—Projected daily calorie 
consumption in developing 
countries, all scenarios





















Progressive policy actions 
scenario
Policy failure scenario
Technology and natural resource 
management failure scenario 
Figure 9—Projected child undernourish-
ment in developing countries, 
all scenarios
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.11
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Figure 10—Projected child undernour-
ishment in South Asia, all 
scenarios
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Figure 12—Projected child undernour-
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Progressive policy actions scenario
Policy failure scenario
Technology and natural resource 
management failure scenario
Figure 11—Projected child undernour-
ishment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, all scenarios
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
Figure 13—Projected child undernour-

























Technology and natural resource 
management failure scenario
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.culture and rural development, along with invest-
ment in human development, such as in education
and health care. However, despite these new com-
mitments to reduce malnutrition and hunger, an
increase in the share of public spending devoted to
these key areas has not accompanied these initia-
tives. In a subset of 20 of these 34 most food-inse-
cure countries for which information on government
spending is available, only 10 have increased their
agriculture spending as a share of total expendi-
tures, whereas 10 others have decreased their agri-
cultural outlay. Similar analysis of government
health spending reflects that only six countries have
increased their health spending share, while 11
actually decreased this share (IMF 2003).
4 Clearly,
real impacts on the ground will not be felt from pol-
icy declarations alone: food-insecure countries must
put more public investment into agriculture, rural
development, and human development to accom-
pany their ambitious initiatives.
Even the progressive policy actions scenario
does not result in food and nutrition security for all in
the foreseeable future. Complementary policy actions
on a larger scale for social security and large-scale
interventions to improve human resources—such as
early childhood nutritional action, school feeding,
and social safety nets—are needed on a sustained
basis to achieve food security for all (Coady 2001;
Skoufias 2001; Ahmed and del Ninno 2002).
Finally, the elimination of food insecurity will not hap-
pen until women achieve full social and economic
participation and rights. Despite their central role in
both traditional and modern agricultural households,
women in many countries are undervalued and lack
many civil liberties. Women’s lack of equal access
and opportunity in areas such as secondary and
higher education has stunted their productive poten-
tial. Perhaps more important than their economic
potential, this denial of access and opportunity
inhibits women’s individual freedom and the broad
realization of their social participation. Achieving full
food security at the household level will require
expanded opportunities for women (Runge et al.
2003).
4 The ratio of agricultural expenditure to total expenditure, and ratio of health expenditure to total expenditure, comparing first
and latest data available for each country for the period 1991–2004. 
12Box 3—The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the 
Maputo Declaration
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is a pledge by African leaders to develop a
program for action for the redevelopment of the African continent. The goals of NEPAD are to pro-
mote accelerated growth and sustainable development, eradicate widespread and severe poverty,
and halt the marginalization of Africa. NEPAD has given high priority to agriculture and has deter-
mined that it will act as the prime engine of African economic growth. For NEPAD, agriculture will be
the economic sector to deliver broad-based economic advancement through improved food security,
income generation, and diversified export growth. 
NEPAD’s strategy is outlined in the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
(CAADP) prepared by the NEPAD secretariat with FAO’s assistance. This program outlines five prior-
ity areas: (1) extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control sys-
tems; (2) improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access; (3) increasing
food supply and reducing hunger; (4) improving agricultural research and technology dissemination
and adoption; and (5) improving responses to disaster and emergencies. NEPAD also seeks to ensure
the establishment of regional food reserve systems, linked to Africa’s own production, and the devel-
opment of policies and strategies under the African Union and regional economic communities to fight
hunger and poverty in Africa. African Union member states pledged to allocate at least 10 percent of
national budgetary resources for the implementation of these goals within five years. 
With new political initiatives such as NEPAD paving the way, efforts to strengthen the political
commitment to achieving Africa’s food and nutrition security are gaining momentum. Specifically, the
all-Africa conference, “Assuring Food and Nutrition Security in Africa by 2020, facilitated by IFPRI
and held in Kampala, Uganda, April 1–3, 2004, sought to provide a forum to build strategies for
ending food and nutrition insecurity in Africa. By bringing together key traditional and new actors
and stakeholders from across the continent, the 2020 Africa Conference offered a unique opportuni-
ty to focus on prioritizing actions, strengthening actors, and facilitating partnerships. In addressing
implementation constraints, the 2020 Africa Conference noted that no food or nutrition security strat-
egy, whether at a continental, regional, country, or local level, is viable if it does not include a well-
developed and well-articulated implementation framework. The conference also made clear that a col-
lective effort to ensure political will and commitment at all levels is critical to undertake the necessary
actions to end hunger and malnutrition in Africa. More information can be found at: 
<http://www.ifpri.org/2020africaconference/index.htm>.
13The policy failure scenario assumes greater political
discord and more extensive agricultural protection-
ism, together with the failure of policies to deal with
food emergencies related to conflict. In this sce-
nario, developing countries’ net cereal trade is sub-
stantially less than in the other two scenarios (Figure
14), because of unfavorable terms of trade and low
income growth in developing countries. World
prices for some commodities decline because pro-
ducer subsidies increase, while at the same time
domestic food prices increase because of the con-
sumer taxation effect of trade restrictions. Slow
growth and trade restrictions lead to stagnation in
average per capita calorie availability, which remains
only slightly above minimum requirements until after
2030, when availability increases (Figure 8).
In addition, crucial investments in agriculture, rural
development, and poverty reduction are forgone or
displaced. Because of limited investment in agricul-
ture research and technology, this scenario has a
high level of crop area expansion owing to rela-
tively rapid population growth and slim yield
improvements in developing countries (Figures 4
and 15). Irrigated area as a proportion of total cere-
al area declines (Figure 16). This scenario also results
in relatively flat maize prices, declining per capita
cereal demand, and falling beef prices after 2020
and in flat meat demand (Figures 6, 17, 18, and 19).
As a result of the policies in this scenario, the
number of malnourished children in developing coun-
tries rises between 1997 and 2015, after which
thereare only modest declines (Figure 9). Furthermore,
the impact of the policy failure scenario would
severely worsen the already desperate situation of
people affected by conflict and HIV/AIDS.              
The deleterious results of this scenario on food
production and availability severely worsen the plight
of already vulnerable households, driving them deep-
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Figure 14—Projected net cereal trade in 
developing countries, all
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Figure 15—Projected world cereal 
yields, all scenarios
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Figure 16—Projected irrigated cereal 
area as a share of total 
cereal area in developing 
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Figure 17—Projected world maize 
price, all scenarios
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Figure 18—Projected world meat  
demand per capita, all
scenarios
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.
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er into poverty and exerting an irrevocable impact on
people’s health and nutritional status, especially chil-
dren. See the appendix for more details on the assump-
tions and projections made under this scenario.
Stalled Agricultural Trade
Agreements and Market Reforms
IFPRI research has demonstrated that farm subsidies
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries have displaced
approximately US$40 billion in net agricultural exports
per year from developing countries and reduced agri-cultural incomes in those countries by nearly US$30 bil-
lion (Diaz-Bonilla and Gulati 2003). The govern-
ments of the OECD member countries spend about
US$75 billion annually on subsidies to their own farm-
ers and agricultural industries and force their consumers
to pay about US$240 billion a year extra for food
because of their own protectionist measures (Diaz-
Bonilla and Gulati 2003). These combined payments
depress global farm prices and bear no relation to
production costs. In addition, high tariffs on agricul-
tural imports from the developing world—four to five
times greater than tariffs on manufactured goods—
keep crucial developing-country exports, such as beef,
sugar, and cotton, from entering the developed-country
markets, thereby stymieing opportunities for growth,
poverty reduction, and improvements in food security
and nutrition. The negotiation framework that World
Trade Organization member countries agreed to at
the Doha Round of trade negotiations in July 2004
should facilitate addressing these issues, but the real
negotiations and actions are yet to come, and positive
outcomes remain highly uncertain. Failure to reduce
OECD agricultural protection could lead to retaliatory
protectionism in developing countries.
For their part, developing countries themselves
must work to reduce their own biases against the
agricultural sector along with maintaining a trade pol-
icy that reduces agricultural protectionism, in order to
improve the benefits that the developing world and its
poor farmers can reap from trade in farm products.
Agricultural protectionism in developing countries
translates into higher food prices for domestic con-
sumers and net buyers of food. This added tax on
food has a negative impact on poor households, who
already spend a large share of their budget on food,
and is mainly received by large agricultural produc-
ers. Furthermore, many developing countries do not
adequately invest in their agricultural and rural sectors,
favoring instead the industrial sectors. Targeting key
investments to reduce poverty and hunger in the rural
sector, such as toward health care, infrastructure devel-
opment, land tenure, water access, technology, and
political participation for poor groups, could do much
to facilitate opportunities for poor farmers to compete
in broader markets.
Food Emergencies: Conflict 
and HIV/AIDS 
The prospects for peace are encouraging in some
long-term conflict zones. Angola’s civil war recently
ended after nearly three decades, and cease-fire
negotiations are under way in Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, conflict
in the northern Darfur region of western Sudan contin
Furthermore, peace in Liberia seems to exist primari-
ly on paper, and conflict continues to exist in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Burundi, and Uganda. Violence has
recently broken out in Haiti, severely complicating an
already precarious food-security situation. Women
and children are especially affected by conflict and
its aftermath, as conflict compromises their already
disproportionately vulnerable situations. The vast
majority of displaced persons are women and children. 
The ongoing presence of conflict has long-term
ripple effects on food security, destabilizing markets,
reducing productivity, and diverting crucial and
sparse resources and investments at both the govern-
ment and household level. Civil and political conflict
thus exists in tandem with food insecurity in some
parts of the world where food security is low. Conflict
causes food insecurity by destroying social welfare,
devastating physical and health infrastructure, desta-
bilizing market opportunities and agricultural devel-
opment, and increasing susceptibility to agricultural
shocks, such as bad harvests or risky weather. As
conflict depresses production and income from cash
crops and livestock, this in turn further depresses food
security and reduces resistance to unfavorable har-
vests or crop losses. 
Research by IFPRI and the FAO has estimated the
developing world’s conflict-induced losses of agricul-
tural output at $121 billion in real terms during
1970–97 (Messer, Cohen, and D’Costa 1998). In
Sub-Saharan Africa, the losses in the 1980s and
1990s accounted for more than 50 percent of all aid
received, and far exceeded foreign investment
inflows (Messer, Cohen, and D’Costa 1998). The
food security impact was particularly devastating,
because in almost all of the affected countries, the
majority of the workforce depended on agricultural
livelihoods (Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001).
Consistent with these findings, the World Bank esti-
1617
mated that civil war lowers per capita gross domes-
tic product by 2.2 percentage points per year (World
Bank 2000a). In addition, military spending often
comes at the expense of agriculture and rural devel-
opment spending, health, primary education, and
food and nutrition investments. In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, low- and middle-income countries
devoted nearly 13 percent of government budgets to
defense, but only about 5 percent to agriculture and
rural development (FAO 2001).
HIV/AIDS and Food Insecurity
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is inextricably linked to
issues of food and nutrition: food insecurity may drive
people toward livelihood strategies that increase the
risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, and HIV/AIDS, com-
bined with food and nutrition insecurity, leads to
severe malnutrition and deepened poverty (Gillespie
and Haddad 2002). Adequate income generation,
which in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing
regions is still mostly linked to agriculture, and access
to sufficient and healthy food and nutrition are thus
essential components in fighting HIV/AIDS and help-
ing HIV/AIDS victims to live healthier, longer, and
more productive lives. 
The pandemic of HIV/AIDS has had a severe
impact on food security by killing breadwinners,
increasing dependency ratios, orphaning millions of
children, dramatically increasing HIV/AIDS-related
expenses, rapidly depleting assets, and diverting cru-
cial resources from sustainable investments in house-
hold food security. In households affected by
HIV/AIDS, food consumption has been shown to
drop by 40 percent (Diaz-Bonilla and Gulati 2003).
In addition, HIV/AIDS reduces the ability of nations
to prevent and mitigate food emergencies, by taking
the lives of crucial professionals in social services and
government (Piot and Pinstrup-Andersen 2002).
Moreover, the pandemic is reinforced by and wors-
ens other crises, as shown by the southern African
food crisis of 2001–02, where climatic stresses were
exacerbated by conflicts, poverty, resource degrada-
tion—and HIV/AIDS. 
Studies have also shown a link between AIDS
and decreased agricultural production. Households
are affected in many ways when household members
are infected by AIDS, including income loss, loss of
assets that must be sold to cover the costs of illness,
and the loss of skills as the household members with
knowledge of farming and wild products succumb to
the disease (de Waal and Whiteside 2003). A
decline in available household labor due to AIDS
mortality and morbidity has a significant impact on
household agricultural productivity. One study from
Zimbabwe showed a reduction of 61 percent in mar-
keted maize due to AIDS-related deaths, compared
with a 45 percent reduction due to adult household
member deaths from other causes (Kwaramba
1998).
HIV infection, compounded by inadequate
dietary intake, leads to or worsens malnutrition.
Malnutrition in turn shortens the asymptomatic period
of HIV infection, hastens the onset of AIDS, and ulti-
mately death, and may also increase the risk of HIV
transmission from mothers to babies. Child care in
households affected by HIV/AIDS is often compro-
mised, and when the productive capacity of the house-
hold diminishes, more nutritionally vulnerable babies
and young children suffer most (Jayne et al. 2004). 
Creating availability of and access to food and
proper nutrition for those at risk of infection or
already infected are therefore critical policy actions
needed to both reduce the prevalence and slow the
onset of the disease. Agricultural policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa must be designed to meet the chal-
lenges posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, in synergy
with other policies, in particular, labor, health, edu-
cation, and nutrition policies. By enhancing agricul-
tural productivity and food and nutrition security, agri-
cultural policy can make an enormous impact on
slowing and mitigating the spread of HIV/AIDS in the
region. Agricultural technologies, for example, need
to help poor households adapt to labor constraints
imposed by HIV/AIDS while raising productivity lev-
els (Gillespie and Haddad 2002), and diversified
production and enriched foods can improve the nutri-
tion of affected households. Making agriculture work
for those at risk and affected by HIV/AIDS will be cru-
cial for halting and reversing the downward spiral of
increasing hunger and malnutrition in the region.18
5.  Technology and Natural Resource
Management Failure Scenario
In the technology and natural resource manage-
ment failure scenario, agricultural trade protection-
ism does not increase as in the preceding scenario,
but technology and natural resource failures are
severe. In this scenario, yield growth falls even
more than in the preceding scenario, forcing farm-
ers to move into marginal producing areas, causing
a more rapid expansion of cereal area into less pro-
ductive land that does not compensate for the yield
shortfalls (and causes environmental degradation)
(Figures 16 and 20). As a result, maize prices rise
substantially through 2030 and fall off only gradu-
ally thereafter (Figure 17). Beef and other meat
prices, which are affected by the price of feed, fol-
low a similar pattern (Figure 6). These price trends
together with slower income growth due to poor
growth in agriculture result in a decline in global
per capita meat demand through 2030, followed
by a slight increase as population growth declines,
and a decline in global per capita cereal demand
throughout the period to 2050 (Figures 18 and 19). 
Developing-country per capita calorie availabil-
ity is essentially unchanged over 1997–2050 and
remains at an average level of bare adequacy
(Figure 8). Given unequal access to the food that is
available, millions of people actually consume less
than the minimum. Child undernourishment is even
greater than in the policy failure scenario in all devel-
oping-country regions (Figures 9-13). Overall, the
technology and resource management failure sce-
nario results in the worst impact on food security and
child nourishment in the developing world. Below,
we briefly explore why natural resource manage-
ment and technology adoption in agriculture are so
critical to the world’s most food-insecure people. See
the appendix for more details on the assumptions
and projections made under this scenario.
Natural Resource Use 
and Institutions 
Unsustainable management of the natural resource
base upon which agriculture depends impinges
considerably on food security. In many developing
countries, poverty, weak agricultural productivity,
and environmental degradation interact in a vicious
downward spiral. This is especially true in resource-
poor areas with fragile soils, irregular rainfall, rela-
tively high population concentrations and growth
rates, and stagnant productivity in agriculture. Such
areas are home to hundreds of millions of food-inse-
cure people. Nearly two-thirds of the rural popula-
tion of developing countries (1.8 billion people) live
in such areas, including marginal agricultural
areas, forests and woodlands, and arid zones.
Poor agricultural productivity and land degradation
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Figure 20—Projected world cereal 
area, all scenarios
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections 2004.deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, and soil
nutrient depletion are widespread. 
A great deal of environmental degradation,
particularly soil degradation and deforestation, is
concentrated in resource-poor areas that have not
adopted modern technology and where yield
growth has failed to keep up with population
growth. Poor rural people often cannot privately
afford to invest in land improvements. As part of this
vicious cycle, degradation and lack of access to
high-quality land frequently push poor people into
clearing forests and pastures for cultivation at the
expense of wildlife habitat and rangeland, con-
tributing to further degradation, productivity losses,
and reduced biodiversity. 
These negative trends in less-favored areas must
be countered through a range of initiatives. The rate
of investment in crop breeding targeted to rainfed
environments is crucial to future crop yield growth.
Strong progress has been made in breeding for
enhanced crop yields in rainfed areas, even in the
more marginal rainfed environments, but adoption
rates can be enhanced with improved policies.
Crop research targeted to less-favored areas should
be accompanied by increased investment in rural
infrastructure and policies to close the gap between
potential yields in less-favored areas and the actual
yields achieved by farmers. Higher priority should
be given to farmers in less-favored areas for agri-
cultural extension services and access to markets,
credit, and input supplies. Successful development
of these areas is more complex than in high-poten-
tial irrigated areas because of their relative lack of
access to infrastructure and markets, and their more
difficult and variable agroclimatic environments.
Progress may also be slower than in the early green
revolution because new approaches will need to be
developed for specific environments and tried on a
small scale before being disseminated more widely.
Investment in rainfed areas, policy reform, and
transfer of technology such as water harvesting will
therefore require stronger partnerships between
agricultural researchers and other agents of
change, including local organizations, farmers,
community leaders, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, national policymakers, and donors
(Rosegrant et al. 2002).
Furthermore, unless properly managed, fresh
water may emerge as one of the key constraints to
global food production. Developing countries are
projected to increase water withdrawals by 27 per-
cent between 1995 and 2025, with the share of
domestic and industrial uses in total water demand
doubling at the expense of agriculture (Rosegrant,
Cai, and Cline 2002). These increases, coupled
with the growing need for irrigation water to meet
food production requirements and the needs for
potable and domestic use of water, could lead to a
severe shortage of available water and, by reduc-
ing the amount of water available for agriculture
and to poor farmers, a severe food crisis. As seen
in the technology and natural resource manage-
ment failure scenario, if current water policies wors-
en, agricultural production will drop as average
cereal yield growth will decline from 1.9 percent
per year between 1982 to 1995 to 0.30 percent
between 1997 and 2050, as farmers will be
unable to increase crop yields with relatively declin-
ing water supply. 
A major factor in improving the use and man-
agement of natural resources for greater food secu-
rity and poverty reduction involves strengthening
the local institutions that govern resource use. Both
systems of property rights and collective action cre-
ate local incentives for investment in sustainable
resource management strategies and improve food
security, and both affect the application of agricul-
tural technologies and natural resource manage-
ment practices. Property rights and collective action
also contribute to risk sharing, access to informa-
tion, and improved technology use and manage-
ment. Although property rights and collective action
can work in mutually reinforcing ways, different
types of agricultural technology application and
natural resource management strategies may
require greater emphasis on either property rights
or collective action. For some types of technologies
that require long time horizons between adoption
and payoff, property rights are critical. For
instance, farmers who do not have secure property
rights are often not allowed to plant trees or lack
incentives to do terracing. Furthermore, when the
spatial scale of new technologies is increased—for
instance, when a new technology is not effective
19unless adopted by large groups of farms in an area,
such as integrated pest management strategies—
collective action is needed to make this investment
work. Recognizing the rights of women to natural
resources is also important for food security: IFPRI
research suggests that where women have inde-
pendent rights to land or are recognized as co-own-
ers of land with their husbands, they also have more
bargaining power within the household; this has
been shown to increase the proportion of house-
hold income spent on food, education, and the wel-
fare of children (Quisumbing et al. 1995). 
Technology Adoption for 
Risk Reduction
New technological advances in the agricultural sci-
ences also offer the potential to offset natural
resource degradation, increase crop yield, and pro-
vide greater food security for the world’s poor. Crop
technology, soil fertility management, irrigation,
and information technology collectively offer many
benefits to improve agricultural productivity. Yet,
hampered by low public spending in agricultural
research and development, agrotechnology is slow
to spread to the world’s poorest farmers and most
food-insecure populations. 
Increased agricultural research and technology
dissemination can help alleviate food security in a
number of ways, such as by helping poor farmers
increase their own farms’ production, thus provid-
ing more food and nutrients for their own consump-
tion and increasing output of marketed products to
generate income. Agricultural technology adoption
also leads to greater agricultural employment and
higher wages, economic growth in the nonfarm
rural and urban economies, lower per unit costs of
food production and lower food prices (enabling
greater physical and economic access to crops that
are high in nutrients), increased access by the rural
poor to decision-making processes, enhanced
capacity for collective action, and reduced vulnera-
bility to economic shocks (Hazell and Haddad
2001).
Institutions that proactively address risk inherent
in technology adoption can also help poor farmers;
for instance, without social safety net programs to
assist farmers, they may be unwilling to invest in a
technology to increase agricultural productivity if
risky agroclimatic conditions make it probable that
input investments will be lost in an unfavorable year.
Government policies can also help improve
agrotechnology adoption by poor farmers through
the dissemination of technology packages that both
large and small farms can adopt and by establish-
ing efficient input, credit, and product markets so
that small farmers can have access to modern inputs
and information.
In the past two decades, information and com-
munications technologies (ICTs) have greatly
changed food and agriculture systems. Access to
information and the ability to use it efficiently are
critical for allocating resources, whether labor, cap-
ital, or natural resources, under market or nonmar-
ket conditions, and for access to public goods. ICTs
contribute to lowering the costs of market use for
farm households and small rural enterprises; reduc-
ing costs and improving quality of public goods pro-
vision (such as research–extension linkages in agri-
culture, and education and health services); more
effective use of existing social networks or their
expansion; and creating new institutional arrange-
ments and consequent strengthening of people’s
rights.
New technology that makes use of geographi-
cally referenced data, such as geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) technology, can provide new
insights into natural resource degradation, climate
change, agricultural performance, and a variety of
other global issues such as poverty, disease, and
conflict. GIS maps may help governments do a bet-
ter job of targeting and prioritizing investments in
rural roads, electricity, health, and education.
Participatory mapping, whereby local communities
are involved in identifying key natural resource
issues, constraints, and management arrangements,
may help to build consensus on land uses and
rights, helping to create local institutional structures
for improved food security. 
Public agricultural research expenditure is criti-
cal to providing technological solutions to the
world’s poor farmers. Scientific research generally
requires uneven investments that the private sector is
not always willing to shoulder, especially if the
20incentives are unclear or unknown. But public agri-
cultural research in developing countries is on the
decline; excluding Nigeria and South Africa, total
public agricultural research-and-development
spending in Sub-Saharan Africa declined by 0.2
percent per year in the 1990s (Beintema and Stads
2004). Developed countries spend about 47 per-
cent of the US$22 billion spent globally on public
agricultural research, and they spend vastly more
per farm and per unit of output than do developing
countries, where spending is dominated by a few
large countries including Brazil, China, and India
(Diaz-Bonilla and Gulati 2003). For agricultural
technology to successfully reach the world’s most
food-insecure populations, the public sector in
developing countries must increase its budgetary
allocation to agricultural research and develop-
ment; in addition, the changing nature of global
agricultural research investment requires that the
public sector develop new partnerships among gov-
ernment, the private sector, nongovernmental
organizations, and farmers.
21Current efforts to reduce hunger are not satisfacto-
ry. Emergencies such as conflicts and the HIV/AIDS
pandemic increasingly threaten and undermine
food security; stalled agricultural trade negotiations
pose a new set of risks and opportunities for vul-
nerable small farmers and for food security in devel-
oping countries; and natural resource degradation
coupled with inadequate technology continue to
pose major obstacles to improving the situation of
the world’s hungry. Although positive signs do exist
on the policy front, new and old risks to food secu-
rity are not being sufficiently addressed by proac-
tive and progressive government policies and
investments. As demonstrated, forgoing progressive
policies and failing to mitigate potential failure sce-
narios will result in at best slowly declining—or in
the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, increasing—num-
bers of hungry people. State failure and conflicts
are root causes of food insecurity in many regions
of the developing world, and insufficient investment
in rebuilding societies after crises renders them vul-
nerable and fertile ground for violence. 
Enhanced agricultural productivity for long-term
food security remains relevant for billions of people
because of the strong connections to job creation,
income generation, price levels, and nutritional
well-being. Implementing the policy changes out-
lined here will be expensive and will require difficult
political choices. As the technology and natural
resource management failure scenario underscores,
governments must renew their commitment to agri-
cultural technology improvement and natural
resource sustainability through augmented invest-
ment in agricultural research and development that
targets the needs of vulnerable, impoverished
households. But the task is far from impossible, and
the costs are far less than the benefits to humankind. 
The progressive policy actions scenario outlines
several of the most crucial steps. National govern-
ments and the international community must assume
a new focus on agricultural growth and rural devel-
opment, along with increasing their investments in
education, social services, and health. Policies to
encourage synergistic growth in the nonfarm sec-
tors are also needed to spur broad-based econom-
ic growth. Underpinning these strategies and
research agendas must be a firm commitment to
reducing hunger and improving the welfare of the
world’s undernourished people. But investment and
growth-oriented policy actions alone will not be suf-
ficient to reach the Millennium Development Goal to
cut hunger by half by 2015 and to end hunger
soon thereafter. Only if these actions include sus-
tained social safety nets will food and nutrition secu-
rity be achieved in the foreseeable future.
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6.  ConclusionTechnical Description 
of Scenarios
In this analysis we use the International Model for
Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and
Trade (IMPACT) to project three future global food
scenarios. IMPACT is a representation of a compet-
itive world agricultural market for 32 crop and live-
stock commodities, including all cereals, soybeans,
roots and tubers, meats, milk, eggs, oils, oilcakes
and meals, sugar and sweeteners, fruits and veg-
etables, and fish. It is specified as a set of 43 coun-
try or regional submodels, within each of which
supply, demand, and prices for agricultural com-
modities are determined. The country and regional
agricultural submodels are linked through trade, a
specification that highlights the interdependence of
countries and commodities in global agricultural
markets. The model uses a system of supply and
demand elasticities incorporated into a series of lin-
ear and nonlinear equations to approximate the
underlying production and demand functions.
World agricultural commodity prices are deter-
mined annually at levels that clear international
markets. Demand is a function of prices, income,
and population growth. Growth in crop production
in each country is determined by crop prices and
the rate of productivity growth. The model is written
in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS)
programming language. The solution of the system
of equations is achieved by using the Gauss-Seidel
method algorithm. This procedure minimizes the
sum of net trade at the international level and seeks
a world market price for a commodity that satisfies
market-clearing conditions. Additional technical
details about IMPACT methodology can be found in
Rosegrant, Meijer, and Cline (2002). 
IMPACT generates annual projections for crop
area, yield, production, demand for food, feed and
other uses, prices, and trade, as well as livestock
numbers, yield, production, demand, prices, and
trade. The current base year is 1997 (using a three-
year average of 1996–98) and the model incorpo-
rates commodity data from FAOSTAT (FAO 2000);
income data from the World Bank (World Bank
1998, 2000b) and the United Nations (United
Nations 1998); a system of supply and demand
elasticities from literature reviews and expert esti-
mates; rates for malnutrition from ACC/SCN
(1996); WHO (1997); and calorie-malnutrition
relationships developed by Smith and Haddad
(2000). While the original version of the model
made projections to the year 2020, the more recent
version of the model used in this paper projects to
2050. Additional details can be found in
Rosegrant, Meijer, and Cline (2002).
To explore food-security effects, IMPACT proj-
ects the percentage and number of malnourished
preschool children (under five years old) in devel-
oping countries. A malnourished child is defined as
a child whose weight-for-age is more than two stan-
dard deviations below the weight-for-age standard
set by the U.S. National Center for Health
Statistics/World Health Organization. The project-
ed number of malnourished children is derived from
a regression model of the functional relationship
between the percentage of malnourished children
and several factors: average per capita calorie con-
sumption and nonfood determinants of child malnu-
trition such as the quality of maternal and child care
(proxied for by the percentage of females under-
taking secondary schooling as well as by females’
status relative to men as captured by the ratio of
female-to-male life expectancy at birth) and health
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Appendixand sanitation (proxied for by the percentage of the
population with access to treated surface water or
untreated but uncontaminated water from another
source). For more details on the regression model,
see Smith and Haddad (2000). 
This analysis presents results from three alterna-
tive scenarios, including a progressive policy
actions scenario, a technology and natural resource
management failure scenario, and a policy failure
scenario. Details on the nonfood parameters used
in the malnourished children projections and the
population projections are presented in the follow-
ing paragraphs, followed by a description of each
scenario and parameter changes for each of those
scenarios.
Average per capita consumption per day is
determined for the three scenarios presented here
from IMPACT runs to 2050 incorporating quantified
parameters for the three scenarios, including
assumptions on area and yield growth, population
and income growth, food preferences, investment
levels, and assumptions regarding openness to
trade. The nonfood determinants of child malnutri-
tion are assumed to improve slowly throughout the
period, with generally greater improvements in the
parameters from 2025 to 2050, based on invest-
ments in social services, including health and edu-
cation. The indicators used for the quality of mater-
nal and child care include the percentage of females
undertaking secondary schooling and the ratio of
female-to-male life expectancy at birth. The indicator
for health and sanitation is measured by the per-
centage of the population with access to treated sur-
face water or untreated but uncontaminated water
from another source. These parameters are the same
for the technology and natural resource manage-
ment failure scenario and the policy failure scenario.
These two scenarios experience slower improve-
ments in these parameters than the progressive poli-
cy actions scenario (see Tables A1 and A2 for a
detailed listing of nonfood parameters by region).
Population projections for these scenarios were
taken from projections carried out for the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) scenarios,
which are based on the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 2001 probabilis-
tic projections for the world (Lutz et al. 2001). The
projections were derived based on qualitative judg-
ments about the magnitude of fertility, mortality, and
migration in 13 world regions. Qualitative assump-
tions were then converted into quantitative assump-
tions based on conditional probabilistic projections.
Using this approach, the high/medium/low cate-
gories were mapped to three evenly divided quar-
tiles of the unconditional probability distributions, as
defined in the IIASA projections, for each compo-
nent of population change. 
Single, deterministic scenarios for fertility, mor-
tality, and migration in each of 13 regions were
derived for each story line, defined as the medians
of the conditional distributions for these variables.
Population projections for each scenario were then
produced based on the deterministic scenarios for
each component of population change. Regional
population projections were then downscaled to the
country level.
Table A3 lists the qualitative assumptions about
fertility, mortality, and migration for each scenario.
These assumptions are expressed qualitatively as
high/medium/low and in relative rather than
absolute terms. That is, a high fertility assumption
for a given region means that fertility is assumed to
be high relative to the median of the probability dis-
tribution for future fertility in the IIASA projections.
The same population projections were used for the
two failure scenarios (policy failure and technology
and natural resource management failure), while a
lower rate of population growth was assumed for
the progressive policy actions scenario. Table A4
lists the total population for several regions as well
as the world total under each scenario.
Progressive Policy Actions
Scenario
In the progressive policy actions scenario, we
assume a new focus on agricultural growth and
rural development. Cereal yield growth is the high-
est under this scenario, with an annual growth rate
of around 1.7 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.4
percent for Latin America and South Asia, and 0.9
percent for China between 1997 and 2050 (Table
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Percent access to 
clean water
Region/country 1997 2015 2030 2050 1997 2015 2030 2050 1997 2015 2030 2050
Nigeria 1.05 1.07 1.10 1.11 29.4 36.7 47.1 72.0 50.0 64.9 75.6 86.1
Northern Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.08 9.0 11.4 21.2
25.2
55.0 37.9 51.3 62.6 77.2
Central and western 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.07 18.9 21.1 37.0 54.5 66.6 74.8 77.8
Southern Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.06 23.5 30.9 37.2 47.0 51.2 66.7 75.6   78.2
Eastern Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.08 12.0 15.7 24.0 50.0 47.2 61.9 71.8 79.2
India 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.08 38.0 50.8 57.8 60.1 81.0 89.6 95.2  96.0  
Pakistan  1.03 1.04 1.04 1.06  20.8 28.7 36.8 54.6  60.0  72.5  81.2  94.0  
Bangladesh  1.03 1.05 1.09 1.13  13.4 21.1 31.9 56.1  79.0  82.9  88.6  99.0  
Other South Asia  1.02 1.04 1.04 1.05  49.6 59.9 66.1 70.7  60.3  71.0  77.2  82.0  
Indonesia  1.06 1.06 1.08 1.12  46.0 56.6 65.0 70.0  60.0  73.3  80.8  88.0  
Thailand  1.08 1.08 1.08 1.09  54.1 63.4 70.6 76.0  89.0  94.3  96.9  96.9  
Malaysia  1.06 1.07 1.07 1.08  64.8 75.6 80.5 81.2 77.0 87.2 92.2 93.2
Philippines 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.09 80.2 88.9 93.4 94.0 84.0 90.3 94.8 98.0
Vietnam 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.09 39.7 51.4 61.1 78.4 43.0 62.4 76.2 94.0
Myanmar 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.10 32.9 40.9 50.0 72.2 60.0 69.4 78.4 96.0
Other Southeast Asia 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.11 45.4 48.3 53.4 67.2 59.6 67.7 72.8 75.9
China 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.07 63.5 70.6 74.6 75.3  67.0  75.6  80.9  84.3  
Latin America 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.11 56.6 59.7 64.2 72.0 77.5 80.2 84.0 86.1
West Asia/North Africa 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 58.5 67.7 72.8 74.5 81.9 88.2   92.4   94.0
Table A1—Nonfood determinants of childhood malnutrition, progressive policy 
actions scenario 
Source: IFPRI IMPACT 2004.
A5). Livestock numbers growth also increases sub-
stantially under this scenario, with annual growth
rates of approximately 2.5 percent in South Asia
and China, 1.9 percent in Latin America, and 1.4
percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Trade protection
does not increase significantly, with producer sub-
sidy equivalents (PSEs) dropping to half the current
levels in 2010, and by half of this level in 2020.
The total cereal area under this scenario expands
slightly at the global level but decreases in certain
regions. Growth in irrigated area is greater under
this scenario than under either of the other two sce-
narios. Of the three scenarios presented here, the
progressive policy actions scenario has greater
improvements over time for the nonfood malnutri-
tion variables described above than either the poli-
cy failure or the technology and natural resource
management failure scenarios. The female-to-male26
Share of female 
secondary education 
participation
Percent access to 
clean water
1997 2015 2030 2050 1997 2015 2030 2050 1997 2015 2030 2050
Nigeria 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.09 29.4 36.7 42.7 50.1 50.0 64.9 73.8 76.8
Northern Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 9.0 11.4 15.2 25.3 37.9 51.3 60.1 64.5
Central and western
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.07 18.9 21.1 24.7 34.4 54.5 66.6 74.8 77.8
Southern Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 23.5 30.9 36.6 44.1 51.2 66.7 75.4 76.8
Eastern Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.05 12.0 15.7 18.9 24.6 47.2 61.9 70.2 71.0
India 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.07 38.0 50.8 57.2 57.3 81.0 89.6 95.2 96.0
Pakistan 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.04 20.8 28.7 36.1 50.9 60.0 72.5 79.1 83.5
Bangladesh 1.03 1.06 1.08 1.11 13.4 21.1 28.6 40.0 79.0 82.9 86.6 89.0
Other South Asia 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.04 49.6 59.9 65.1 65.3 60.3 71.0 76.4 77.9
Indonesia 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.10 46.0 56.6 63.8 63.9 60.0 73.3 79.4 81.0
Thailand 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 54.1 63.4 69.4 69.5 89.0 94.3 96.9 97.0
Malaysia 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.07 64.8 75.6 80.4 80.6 77.0 87.2 92.0 92.0
Philippines 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.07 80.2 88.9 93.3 93.3 84.0 90.3 94.3 95.5
Vietnam 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 39.7 51.4 58.9 67.1 43.0 62.4 73.5 80.4
Myanmar 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.08 32.9 40.9 49.0 67.4 60.0 69.4 75.7 82.5
Other Southeast Asia 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.10 45.4 48.3 50.1 50.9 59.6 67.7 73.7 80.3
China 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.06 63.5 70.6 74.5 74.6 67.0 75.6 80.6 83.0
Latin America 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 56.6 59.7 63.4 68.0 77.5 80.2 83.7 84.7
West Asia/North Africa 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 58.5 67.7 72.6 73.5 81.9 88.2 92.1 92.5
Female-to-male
life expectancy ratio
Table A2—Nonfood determinants of childhood malnutrition, policy failure scenario 
and technology and natural resource management failure scenario
Source: IFPRI IMPACT 2004.
life expectancy ratio, the percentage of females
with access to secondary schooling, and the per-
centage of population with access to an improved
water supply are all higher by 2050 than in the
other two scenarios (Table A1).
Policy Failure Scenario
A multidimensional policy failure scenario assumes
decreases in cereal yield growth and livestock num-
bers growth. Model output data show annual cere-
al yield growth rates (from 1997 to 2050) of 1.06
for Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.69 for Latin America,
0.52 for South Asia, and 0.32 for China. Livestock
numbers growth is also lower at 1.28 percent for
China, 0.33 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.2727
Variable
Progressive policy
actions scenario Policy failure scenario






























Migration High Low Low
Table A3—Fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions for population projections
Source: Lutz et al. 2001.
Notes: I indicates industrialized-country regions; D, developing-country regions; HF, high-fertility regions (total fertility rate > 2.1 in
year 2000); LF, low-fertility regions (1.5 < total fertility rate < 2.1); and VLF, very low fertility regions (total fertility rate < 1.5). 
percent for South Asia, and 0.09 percent for Latin
America (Table A5). This scenario also shows trade
policies that lead to an increase in protection in
many countries (demonstrated by a tripling of PSEs
in 2020). This scenario has a greater level of crop
area expansion than the progressive policy actions
scenario because of high population growth and
low yield improvements. 
Irrigated area under this scenario remains rela-
tively the same throughout the projection period.
The nonfood determinants of the number of mal-
nourished children also improve over time under
this scenario but to a lesser degree than under the




The technology and natural resource management
failure scenario assumes even greater decreases in
yield and numbers growth as well as declines in
crop area growth but without the increased trade
protection shown in the policy failure scenario.
Annual crop yield growth is 0.85 percent for Sub-
Saharan Africa, 0.54 percent for Latin America,
0.44 percent for South Asia, and 0.28 percent for
China. Livestock numbers growth per year is also
lower than under the other scenarios at 1.04 per-
cent in China, 0.22 percent in South Asia, 0.20
percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 0.08 percent in
Latin America (Table A5). Many of the remaining
underlying factors in the technology and natural
resource management failure scenario are similar to
those under the policy failure scenario. The degree
of crop area expansion is greater under this sce-
nario than under the progressive policy actions sce-
nario, while the irrigated area remains relatively the
same throughout the projection period. Low invest-
ments under this scenario lead to low crop yield
improvements in developed and developing coun-
tries. The female-to-male life expectancy ratio, the
percentage of females with access to secondary
schooling, and the percentage of population with
access to an improved water supply also improve
over time under this scenario, but at a lower rate
than under the progressive policy actions scenario
(Table A2).28
Actual







failure scenario  
Region 1997   2020 2050 2020  2050   2020  2050  
Latin America   486 637 742 710 944 710 944
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  602 858 1,109 956 1,570 956 1,570
South Asia  1,289 1,746 1,986 1,953 2,561 1,953 2,561
China 1,249 1,390 1,311 1,464 1,469 1,464 1,469
Developing 
countries   4,491 5,850 6,595 6,414 8,290 6,414 8,290
World 5,786 7,260 8,095 7,777 9,567 7,777 9,567
 
Table A4—Population by scenario (millions of people)
Source: Lutz et al. 2001.
Scenario  
Cereal output   
yield growth rates
a















policy actions  
scenario
Latin America:  1.43




Latin America: 1.93  
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
1.43  





decline by half 
by 2010 then, 
to half of the 



















PSEs raised by 




















South Asia: 0.22  
China: 1.04







Table A5—Parameter changes by scenario
Source: IFPRI IMPACT 2004.
a Cereal yield and livestock numbers growth are calculated using output values, not input growth values.
b See Tables A1 and A2 for greater detail.
c See Tables A3 and A4 for greater detail.References
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